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Kupchan, a prominent scholar of the realist school of international relations and a former senior National Security Council official on European affairs under both th 연이자율계산기 e Obama and Clinton administrations, remarked that Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy priorities such as ending the Ukraine War may be warranted. Regarding South Korea’s political crisis 하반기 금융권 stemming from the martial law declaration by a now-suspended President Yoon Suk Yeol, Kupchan emphasized that it is crucial for advanced democracies to deliver for their citizens and ultimately, rest 이자계산프로그램 ore political centrism.
Charles Kupchan, a Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, poses for an interview with the Kyungh 자동차 제조 yang Daily News. Photo credit: Yoojin Kim
By Yoojin Kim, Washington Correspondent
(Editor’s note: This is a full transcript of the interview published exclusively by the Kyunghyang Daily News. Excerpting the entire or any part of the text without consulting the interviewee or the editor is strictly prohibited. Korean version)
Q: What do you identify as President Biden’s key foreign policy achievements as well as limitations?
A: He restored the United States to its previous status that stands for and abides by the norms of liberal democracy. His presence in the Oval Office, his commitment to the rule of law, his fundamental decency were themselves major steps forward from the Trump administration. The other key accomplishment was the return of the U.S. to multilateralism, particularly in rebuilding the alliances that had been damaged by Trump. If you look today, at NATO and alliances in East Asia, they are, in some ways, as strong as they have ever been, and the relationship between Japan and South Korea has improved. It is by no means a NATO for East Asia, but you begin to have a grid of alliance relationships that amounts more than the sum of its parts.
I think Biden was changed in some ways by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He became a foreign policy president. He thought that we were back in the Cold War era, that Republicans and Democrats would come back together in the service of protecting the free world. He underestimated how much the U.S., and the world has changed. Biden ended up overseeing what I would call a restoration presidency, trying to bring back the old ways. He ended up pursuing a grand strategy for the world as it was. That‘s one of the reasons Trump won.
Q: Would you say that President Biden’s frequent rhetoric of ‘Democracy versus Autocracy’ was a little out of date?
A: Yes, it was more than a little out of date- very out of date. I think it was a mistake to cast the world as a struggle between democracy and autocracy. In many respects, the big challenge of our time is the opposite: to work across ideological dividing lines. To me, it was quite striking that when the Russians invaded Ukraine, Biden said “Us versus Them”, and most of the world responded that “We’re not going to choose; We‘re going to sit on the sidelines.” That was a sign of things to come. We are in a very fluid, what the Indians call multi-alignment world, and those alignments are going to shift on a daily basis.
Q: Will the trend of world having multi-centers, as you put it, or multipolarity continue under Trump?
A: I think that Trump will expedite the transition toward a multi-center world or a multipolar world, because he doesn’t believe in Pax Americana. He doesn’t believe that the world does-or should- rotate around the U.S. I also believe that the old order is no longer viable. That is why I think Trump could be the agent of change we need. I’m not a fan of Trump; I didn‘t vote for Trump. But in some ways, he is going to force us to begin a debate about the need to go from the old model to something new.
I felt that the Biden administration was trying to stop history, saying “China is continuing to grow, the Indians are playing the field, so let’s just hit the pause button.” And you can’t do that. You can’t stop the forward progress of history. I think you can channel it, you can shape it, but you can’t stop it-and trying to do so is a mistake and dangerous. When you have a rising challenger and the number one says, “Stop. We’re not going to let this happen,” you usually get Great Power War. Whether China is going to overtake the United States or remain a little bit behind doesn’t really matter. The question is, will the U.S. and China be peer competitors? The answer is yes- it’s already happening.
Q: What about Trump’s isolationist traits - will they be more intensified in his second term?
A: I don’t think that Trump is an isolationist. I think he has isolationist impulses, but if you look at his first term, he threatened to withdraw from NATO, threatened that South Koreans pay more, and said the same thing to the Japanese. He wanted to withdraw from the Middle East. But at the end of the day, the U.S. troops were still in Asia and Europe, and he hadn’t gotten out of Afghanistan.
So I think he is more of a unilateralist than an isolationist, in part because even if he would like to be an isolationist, he can’t be. The world is too integrated. Even if he might like to build big walls and go back to a Fortress America, in an era of the internet, ballistic missiles and pandemics, those days are gone. There’s no such thing as strategic immunity anymore.
Q: What unilateralist measures can we expect from Trump?
A: He may well pull out of the Paris Climate Agreement. He certainly doesn’t like formal pacts where he thinks his room for maneuver is diminished. My greatest concern on this front is tariffs, which are a form of unilateralism.
If he deploys tariffs to get better trade deals, I’m fine with that. But if he goes 20% on Mexico, 20% on Canada, 60% on China, it blows up the world economy. Then we are back to something that looks more like the 1930s, as countries would retaliate. China is already planning retaliation; in fact, they banned exports of certain critical minerals in response to a tightened U.S. export controls.
Q: Are you worried that his tariff proposals, if they are actually executed, might trigger a global trade war?
A: Yes. What we won’t know until he is in office is whether this is part of leverage by a real estate mogul coming in with an initial position that’s about posturing, or if he is serious. If he is serious, we are in trouble.
Right now we are in a world of considerable geopolitical fracture, but not geoeconomic fracture. We’re not selling them seven-nanometer (semiconductor) chips, and there are other restrictions on investment. But on the broad picture, geoeconomic fracture is way behind what’s happening geopolitically, which is good. If he hits China with big tariffs, then we will see a fracture of the global economy. The economic consequences of a rupture with China would be huge, including for South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.
If he does put high tariffs, not only will it have negative effects on all economies, but it won’t work, because Americans will go to Costco, Walmart or Target, and the price of everything will have gone up. The idea that somehow we will rebuild the American middle class through tariffs is a lie. Democrats are as responsible for this as Republicans. We may open a semiconductor plant, an electric vehicle plant, maybe one or two plants that build refrigerators. But the idea of going back to the manufacturing capital of the world in the digital age is not happening, because the core of the problem is automation, not free trade. You don’t solve the problem of the decline of the American middle class by imposing 60% tariffs on China.
Charles Kupchan, a Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, poses for an interview with the Kyunghyang Daily News. Photo credit: Yoojin Kim
Q: Trump seems to prioritize ending the Ukraine War. What do you envision as a desirable and feasible resolution? Any concerns about Trump’s approach?
A: I very much welcome Trump’s realism. For the last two years, since the beginning of 2023, the United States and its allies have had a policy toward Ukraine but no strategy. Trump and Vance were right saying that Ukraine is not going to win the war and take Crimea by force, so we need to end this sooner or later. As someone who has been on that side of the equation for several years, I’m amazed by how taboo it still is today in this city and foreign policy community to call for a negotiated end to the war.
Most people would arrive at the following definition of success: that 80% of Ukraine survives, can defend itself, is prosperous and secure, and attached to the West. Putin would agree to a deal along those lines- keeping what’s on this side of the front line and call a cease fire. What I worry about is, what else would Putin ask for? He may say, permanent neutrality, no more arms to Ukraine, recognition of Eastern Ukraine as belonging to Russia, or as he said before the invasion, NATO’s pullback from the Eastern Front. All of those demands are unacceptable because they would leave Ukraine exposed (to another invasion).
So the question is: What kind of deal will Trump accept, will he stand up for a sovereign Ukraine even though it may lack 20% of its territory, or is he going to be willing to make a deal that compromises Ukraine‘s long term independence?
Q: How would Ukraine’s demands for NATO membership play into potential negotiations?
A: I understand why Ukrainians keep asking for it, but I don’t think they have a realistic prospect of joining NATO anytime soon. It didn’t happen when Biden was president, and certainly wouldn’t happen when Trump is president. A part of unilateralism is what I would call an aversion to entanglement, which is not wanting to get dragged into other people’s problems, and that goes back to the founding era. I think Trump is very cautious about extending a strategic obligation that may come due. I think that’s sensible.
One of my own personal critiques of the push to bring Ukraine into NATO is that, right now, the U.S. and its allies have made a very clear decision: not to go to war to defend Ukraine, but to provide arms because it is not worth World War III. If that’s the case, then why would you extend NATO to Ukraine, which would obligate you to go to World War III if it gets attacked?
Q: How much of the DPRK involvement, especially sending troops to Russia, will impact the current Ukraine war and future peace negotiations? ROK and U.S. officials argue that the DPRK’s actions signify that security concerns of Europe and Indo-Pacific are being merged.
A: The biggest impact is making it easier for Putin not to call for full-scale mobilization. At least for now, he is able to put together a force that is probably capable of taking back course with the help of 10,000 Korean soldiers. But is the DPRK sending troops a game changer or a turning point? No. It does raise the stakes on some level but I don’t think it as so much about the merging of the Indo Pacific and the European theaters.
To me, it’s more about the impact on North Korea. Does it make Pyongyang more provocative? Is Putin going to give Pyongyang some help with ballistic missiles, warheads or who knows whatelse, enabling the North Koreans to be more risky, provocative, and cause more trouble? The actual impact on the war in Ukraine has, in some ways, been overstated. Biden said that he’s approving deep strikes into Russia because the North Koreans showed up, but I think he did it because he’s leaving office.
Q: In his first term, Trump threatened to withdraw from NATO and also demanded allies like South Korea and Japan increase their burden-sharing. Will alliance relations be further strained under Trump?
A: I don’t think Trump wants to go down in history as the president who dismantled the Western alliance. There isn’t anything to gain. When it comes to withdrawing from NATO, I think the answer is nothing. He uses it as a way to get allies to spend more, and allies have done more. Two-thirds of NATO members now spend 2% (of their GDP on defense). South Korea and Japan are working together and have increased their defense efforts. Taiwan is getting ready to increase defense spending. So he can say, “Hey, it‘s working.”
Will the relationships be difficult? Yes. Right now, those alliances have a taken-for-granted quality, like in the same family. For Trump, allies are transactional partners, not a part of this deeper community. He just doesn’t think in those terms.
Q: How would you characterize the current state of U.S.-China relations? What should the U.S. policy goal towards China be like?
A: We are not yet in Cold War 2.0, but pretty darn close. The momentum, if not arrested, will push us in the direction of something that looks like the Cold War. Maybe the two countries are now on paths that are irreversible. But it would be a mistake not to try to prevent that from happening. Unlike during the 20th century, the world is much more tethered together. How are we going to tackle climate change, nuclear proliferation, global health and global development if China and the U.S. aren’t talking to each other?
China is going through what I would call its 1898 moment; 1898 was the year when the U.S., after 100-plus years of growing economically and demographically, went out on the global stage. Xi Jinping kind of marks that turning point. Nobody stays number one forever, so China has reached a point where they believe they deserve more geopolitical sway.
It is important for us to figure out what constitutes the normal behavior we would attribute to a rising global power, versus what kind of behavior constitutes unacceptable expansionist aggression. Because that’s what we need to stop.
I think the Biden administration had this idea that we could be at each other’s throats over Taiwan, South China Sea, the Philippines, Hong Kong and on Xinjiang, but still be nice to each other and work together on climate change, North Korea. And the Chinese were saying, “No, this is a package deal.”
Q: What are the prospects for the U.S.-China strategic competition under Trump’s second term?
A: I wouldn’t bet on Trump forging a better relationship with China. But Trump will be very comfortable calling Putin and Xi Jinping, and maybe he’ll pick up the phone and call Kim Jong Un. He doesn’t have a diplomatic bone in his body, nor he has a strategic vision of any kind. But he’ll sit down and say, “Make me a deal”, and if he likes the deal, he’ll take it. On some level, that’s what we need. I welcome that kind of transactionalism.
Q: Given Trump’s remarks on his good relationship with Kim Jong Un, do you think another negotiation over the denuclearization of North Korea is likely in the forseeable future?
A: First of all, I would say that Trump has, and should have, other priorities. Dealing with Russia and the war in Ukraine, and Beijing on the U.S.-China relations, and Iran-where it’s not inconceivable that we could be close to a major war in the Middle East -those would be more urgent than having another summit with Kim.
I think the idea of denuclearizing North Korea is obsolete. I can imagine denuclearization taking place, but only after unification or once this regime is gone. Hard to imagine that a North Korea that looks anything like this ever give up nuclear weapons. It’s the only thing they have; their only game in town. If I were trying to map out some kind of diplomacy, it would be more about stability than denuclearization- getting them to stop doing stupid things like testing missiles and taking other provocative actions, contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, and wait them out. I think that would be a much more productive approach.
Q: There are some concerns that Trump may reach a deal with North Korea that compromises South Korea’s security concerns, and that may further embolden public opinion favoring nuclear armament.
A: It would depend upon the nature of the agreement-what kind of confidence building measures or guarantees are there, and whether it is part of a broader rapprochement between Seoul and Pyongyang.
I do not expect South Korea or Japan to go nuclear in the near future. But I do think that Trump’s election will understandably trigger debates about nuclear deterrence in South Korea, Japan, perhaps even countries like Germany. That’s simply because, even if Trump doesn’t withdraw from NATO or tell South Korea “You are on your own,” it seems to me that any responsible government seeing political dysfunction and unreliability in the U.S., will feel the need to start thinking about other plans.
Q: Would American leadership and role in the global world diminish under Trump’s second term?
A: If the question is “Is American influence declining?” the answer is yes. As power diffuses from the West to the East, and from the North to the South, the U.S. just doesn’t have the same level of clout it used to. Of course no country-China included-comes close to the United States in terms of military capability.
What we do not know yet is leadership, because you can have less power and still lead. It is not the scope of American power, but the character of American power that matters. The country is very divided and quite dysfunctional. China is really the only area of bipartisan consensus; on other foreign policy questions, Republicans and Democrats have parted company. Until we solve that domestic problem and rebuild bipartisanship and political centrism, steady leadership will be hard to come by.
Q: While the U.S. tries to focus on great power competition, it still seems to be mired in the conflicts in the Middle East, and there is a growing nexus among Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.
A: There has already been a reorientation. I think you’ll see a lighter U.S. footprint in the Middle East. One of the reasons Trump and then Biden after him, got out of Afghanistan and pursued a limited presence in Syria and Iraq was to get out of the era in which the U.S. focused on the Middle East, and enabling it to focus on Russia and China. Trump’s election was in part the public’s reaction against overreach, particularly in the Middle East. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan gave internationalism a bad name because they cost trillions of dollars, and as far as one can tell, didn’t produce anything good.
Now, even though no Americans dying in Ukraine, billions of dollars are being allocated to the defense of Ukraine. Many Americans are saying, “What about my school where the roof leaks, or the the bridge downtown that is closed for repairs?” There is a kind of sense that there are trade-offs to be made, and Trump gets it. He wants to say that he will solve problems here at home, not 5,000 miles from here, like at the southern border.
Q: Will the American public support that kind of reasoning, the so-called America First foreign policy, regardless of party affiliation?
A: I think a lot of Americans will cheer him on, and think that he has his priorities right. Although the support will depend on what he’s doing things at home-like arresting political opponents or sending the U.S. military to break into people’s homes to arrest undocumented migrants, leading them out in handcuffs to drive them across the border and drop them in Mexico.
I do think that the broader American electorate wants a change. In the context of the foreign policy community, this idea for the need of a next order is still not acceptable. But within the public and in the broader domestic narrative, it’s not just acceptable; to some extent, it is welcomed.
Q: What was your reaction to Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol declaring martial law?
A: To have martial law declared is terrible, but it only lasted for six hours and now you have a process of impeachment. The system is functioning according to the rules. Korea‘s case is a crisis that will pass. In some ways, how it has played out is a testament to the resilience of the system. This is not the end of South Korea’s democracy. It is a test case, and it looks like the country will pass the test.
That’s the good news. The bad news is that, if you take a snapshot of what has happened in the last couple of months- Trump won the U.S. election, clearly indicating that the center will not hold. The French government has collapsed. The German government has collapsed. Then the President of South Korea declared martial law. It is all part of the same phenomenon: a combination of socioeconomic dislocation associated with automation, the amplification of partisan division because of social media, the hollowing out of our political centers.
Q: Do you feel that democracies, in the U.S. and globally, are in decline?
A: I worry much more about the internal threat to American democracy than I do about Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. That’s what keeps me up at night. If the U.S., France, Germany, and South Korea all turn into illiberal democracies or failing democracies, then we’re in a very different world. So the first order of business has to be to get our own houses in order. If we do that, we’ll figure out how to deal with Russia and China. If we don’t, I think Russia and China will eat us for lunch, because of political dysfunction.
Democracies will ultimately win out, but only if they demonstrate to their citizens and to citizens around the world, that they work, that they deliver for their citizens, and that they preserve freedom. Right now, I don’t think the many democratic states are putting their best foot forward.
Q: Is Trump the biggest threat to American democracy?
A: I would call it the Trump phenomenon, not just Trump himself. It is quite worrying to me that an entire political party has essentially not just tolerated but bought into what I would call a very dangerous agenda. This is because of such popular support for Trump, that people who should know better go along with Trump because if they don‘t, they risk losing their jobs. There was that article the other day about people going to Mar-a-Lago to get a job, are asked “Do you believe that Trump won the 2020 election?”. To get a job in the U.S. government, you need to lie. That’s a problem.
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